This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes...
This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing t...
The concepts of game theory (rationality etc) now pervade much of social science, so that Professor Zagare's exposition of game theory and its applications (intended to convert the unconverted and initiate the uninitiated) is very welcome. He provides methods for analysing the structure of the game; considers zero and nonzero-sum games and the fundamental 'minimax theorem'; and investigates games with more than two players, including the possibility of coalitions between players. Diverse examples give the reader an idea of how the theory can be applied to a wide range of situations.
The concepts of game theory (rationality etc) now pervade much of social science, so that Professor Zagare's exposition of game theory and its applica...
This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes...
This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing t...
"Frank C. Zagare combines a deep command of historical scholarship and the sophisticated skills of an applied game theorist to develop and test a theory of why deterrence failed, catastrophically, in July 1914. . . . Zagare concludes with sage advice on how to avoid even more cataclysmic breakdowns in a nuclear world." ---Steven J. Brams, New York University
"Zagare's deft study of the origins of the First World War using his perfect deterrence theory uncovers new insights into that signal event and shows the value of formal theory applied to historical events. A must-read for...
"Frank C. Zagare combines a deep command of historical scholarship and the sophisticated skills of an applied game theorist to develop and test a t...
"Frank C. Zagare combines a deep command of historical scholarship and the sophisticated skills of an applied game theorist to develop and test a theory of why deterrence failed, catastrophically, in July 1914. . . . Zagare concludes with sage advice on how to avoid even more cataclysmic breakdowns in a nuclear world." ---Steven J. Brams, New York University
"Zagare's deft study of the origins of the First World War using his perfect deterrence theory uncovers new insights into that signal event and shows the value of formal theory applied to historical events. A must-read for...
"Frank C. Zagare combines a deep command of historical scholarship and the sophisticated skills of an applied game theorist to develop and test a t...